The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
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The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice
Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes, yet their behavior is not well understood, even among themselves. Using statistical methods, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making to dispel the mystery of how decisions from district courts to the Supreme Court are made.
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